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I. INTRODUCTION
On February 15, 2006, the House Committee on International Relations
invited executives from Google, Inc., Microsoft Corp., Yahoo!, Inc., and
Cisco Systems, Inc. to what was supposed to be a “discussion” about
these American corporations’ cooperation with China to enforce Chinese
Internet censorship and persecute China’s political dissidents. 1 Instead,
Congressman Christopher Smith (R-NJ) launched a scathing attack on
the executives, listing names of dissidents jailed for their Internet
postings and reminding the corporations of their roles in the dissidents’
captures. 2 Congressman Smith next accused Google of compromising
its do-no-evil policy by bowing to the will of China’s oppressive
government. 3 Congressman Smith also compared the corporations to
IBM in Nazi Germany and alleged, “U.S. technology companies today
are engaged in a similar sickening collaboration, decapitating the voice
of the dissidents.” 4 Congressman Tom Lantos (D-Cal.) summarized the
reason for the hearing: “What Congress is looking for is real spine and a
willingness to stand up to the outrageous demands of a totalitarian
regime. Your abhorrent activities in China are a disgrace.” 5
During the ensuing interrogation, the corporations attempted to defend
their actions by arguing they picked the lesser of two evils: complying
with Chinese law by censoring the Internet, instead of leaving the
Chinese market altogether and thus allowing the Chinese search engines
to conduct their own censorship, presumably more rigorously than their

1. See The Internet in China: A Tool for Freedom or Suppression?: Joint Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Africa., Global Human Rights and Int’l Operations and the
Subcomm. on Asia and the Pacific, 109th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter Hearing].
2. These include online posters Li Zhi and Shi Tao, who drew eight and ten years
respectively in prison for expressing their opinions on the Internet. Yahoo! Inc. provided
the Chinese government with the physical location of these online posters. Id. at 1–2, 10
(statements of Rep. Christopher Smith, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Africa, Global Human
Rights and International Operations and Rep. James Leach, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on
Asia and the Pacific). In addition to Yahoo!’s cooperation with the Chinese government
in enforcing China’s Internet censorship regulations, Google stands accused of censoring
its search engine at the request of the Chinese government, Microsoft of censoring
personal websites by Chinese citizens that express opinions contrary to that of the government,
and Cisco Systems (an Internet hardware company) of providing the Chinese government
with the technology necessary to control the Internet. Id. at 3.
3. Id. at 3.
4. His reference here is from Edwin Black’s book documenting how IBM
knowingly provided Nazi Germany with the ability to operate at “Blitzkrieg efficiency.”
Id. at 2 (statement of Rep. Christopher Smith); see EDWIN BLACK, IBM AND THE
HOLOCAUST 203 (2001); see also THE CORPORATION (Zeitgeist Films 2004) (exploring
IBM’s role in aiding Nazi Germany). In its own defense, IBM states that the Nazi party,
apart from IBM, controlled IBM’s German subsidiary.
5. Hearing, supra note 1, at 8 (statement of Rep. Tom Lantos, Member, H.
Subcomm. on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations).
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American counterparts. 6 Congressman Lantos, however, addressed the
executives in plain speech, asking each if he was ashamed of the actions
of each corporation or could see the similarities between the corporation’s
actions and that of IBM in aiding Nazi Germany. 7 The executives
avoided the question. 8
After Congressman Lantos concluded his inquiry into the morality of
their actions, Congressman Brad Sherman (D-Cal.) addressed the legal issue:
[W]hat have you done to tell your Chinese customers that they have a lower
expectation of privacy and that you will comply not with the law of your
democratically elected host government, namely the United States, but rather
6. From the hearing transcript, edited for clarity:
[YAHOO] Our belief, Mr. Congressman, is that the benefits of having access
to communication service, as well as access to independent sources of
information, coupled with the extreme large number of searches and other
activity that happens on the Web, provides an extraordinary benefit. We
recognize these extreme challenges as well, and we are ready to tackle those,
along with our industry peers and with government, in partnership to make this
a government-to-government dialogue.
[MICROSOFT] I would just reiterate that we think these are very difficult
issues, which I think is clear from some of the questions from the Members,
but we, too, think, on balance, that it is better for Microsoft and the other
companies here at the table and other United States Internet companies to be
engaged in China. We think that the benefits far outweigh the downside in
terms of promoting freedom of expression.
[GOOGLE] We made the decision to enter the market because we believe in
making information available and accessible. We believe that doing that will
achieve positive things. As I said in my testimony and in my oral statement, if,
over time, we do not achieve the results that we seek, because your question is
a legitimate one, we will reconsider our role there.
[CISCO] The Internet is many different things to different people. For some,
it is a source of empowerment, enlightenment, giving them access to information
they never had before. Others are frightened by that empowerment and see
nonstate actors, whether they are multinational corporations or terrorists or
antiglobalization activists, empowered against legitimate state authority, and
others see the Internet being used as a tool of repression. I think all of those
are correct.
Id. at 90. For the opposing view that globalization alone is enough to bring democracy
and freedom to less democratic governments, see THOMAS FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS
FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 10 (2005) (claiming that
globalization has “made us all next-door neighbors”).
7. “Can you say in English that you are ashamed of what you and your company
and the other companies have done? . . . IBM complied with legal orders when they
cooperated with Nazi Germany. . . . [D]o you think that IBM, during that period, had
something to be ashamed of?” Hearing, supra note 1, at 97–98 (statement of Rep. Tom
Lantos).
8. Id.
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that you will furnish information upon the request of an un-elected, undemocratic and oppressive government in China? 9

This Comment will focus on the issue of the role of American
corporations in enforcing Chinese censorship law.
In the hands of the Chinese government, the increased freedom of
speech granted by the Internet and brought to China via American
corporations is curtailed by state-sponsored censorship. To do business
in China, American companies must comply with Chinese Internet
censorship laws, yet these very laws not only restrain the freedom of
speech of Chinese citizens but also subject offenders to the whim of the
Chinese secret police. As accurately stated in the hearing, Yahoo! aided
China in arresting at least two Chinese online writers for the crime of
disagreeing with the government. 10 The United States must act to stop
American corporations from further participating in China’s persecution
of its political dissidents.
At the conclusion of this hearing, Congress proposed a possible
solution in the Global Online Freedom Act, a bill that would reach and
punish American companies engaged in enforcing Chinese state-sponsored
censorship. 11 Although the bill embodies ambitious ideals, as this
Comment explains, its passage forces other nations to follow United
States law wherever private United States companies operate. 12 Instead,
Congress should examine additional short-term solutions that avoid
imposing American law onto another sovereign nation and circumvent
unresolved issues of international Internet regulation. 13
Part II of the Comment briefly surveys the history of the Internet,
focusing on previous attempts at Internet regulation, both domestic and
foreign. It will highlight the social causes of these regulations and
explore the results when social values in one country do not comport
with the values in another. Part III addresses the Global Online Freedom
Act, particularly its purpose, provisions, and criticisms. This Part also
considers alternative short-term solutions to this bill that avoid the

9. Id. at 117. Here, Congressman Sherman uses the term expectation of privacy
not in a legal sense, but in a colloquial sense to convey that the corporations do not
afford equal treatment to Chinese citizens, as opposed to American customers.
10. See Amnesty International, Undermining Freedom of Expression in China,
July 2006, http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGPOL300262006.
11. Global Online Freedom Act of 2006, H.R. 4780, 109th Cong. (2006); Global
Online Freedom Act of 2007, H.R. 275, 110th Cong. (as reported by H. Comm. on
Foreign Affairs on Dec. 10, 2007).
12. See infra Part III.A.
13. The best long-term solution to this conundrum would be the enactment of
international Internet regulations. However, this Comment will not explore in depth this
much larger and more complex question of whether worldwide Internet laws should be
enacted and whether the Internet should even come under international control.
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blatant interjection of United States law into another sovereign state and
analyzes the viability and requirements for the success of these solutions
in China. Part IV follows with a final recommendation of the best course of
action at this time: the promotion of proxy-blocking Internet services
coupled with the economic pressure of the international community to
force China to cease persecution of its online political dissidents.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Initial Promise of the Internet
In 1969, the United States military envisioned a system that could link
military, defense, and university members engaged in defense
research. 14 From this vision, the Defense Advanced Research Project
Agency (DARPA) invented the ARPANET (Advanced Research Project
Network), the early precursor to the Internet.15 The ARPANET consisted
of an intangible network connecting innumerable smaller groups of
computer networks. 16 ARPANET facilitated the decentralized and rapid
transmission of information from individual to individual.17 As it grew in
use and popularity, networks similar to ARPANET sprung up, linking
businesses, universities, and research facilities around the world.18
Eventually these networks merged together into what is known today as
the Internet. 19 In the 1980s, the Internet experienced extraordinary
growth so that today the Internet connects one billion users from every
country in the world. 20
The secret of the Internet’s success has remained unchanged from its
inception to present time; as a completely decentralized, self-maintaining
entity, the control of information lies in the hands of each user.21 Whatever
each user chooses to view, publish, or discuss defines the boundaries of
that user’s cyberspace. 22 Moreover, Internet information dwells in this
14. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844
(1997) (summarizing the creation and development of the Internet).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. These networks included BITNET, FIDONET, and USENET. Id.
19. Id.
20. Internet World Stats is commonly cited authority on Internet usage by country
and worldwide. Internet World Stats, http://www.internetworldstats.com.
21. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 831, 838.
22. Cyberspace, the term now used almost synonymously with Internet to describe
that nebulous realm where humans can gather to exchange ideas, was originally coined

215

SHYU POST-AUTHOR PAGES.DOC

4/22/2008 1:33:43 PM

cyberspace—inside an intangible realm that has no centralized storage
location or control point. 23 Consequently, it eludes the control of any
single business, individual, or country. 24
The Internet’s power stems from its ability to grant an unprecedented
forum for free speech. 25 Using the Internet, users can communicate via
email, bulletin boards, public forums, and chat rooms. 26 More recently,
web blogs have surged in popularity, significantly adding to the amount
of personal websites. In addition, the convenience and affordability of
the Internet allows almost any individual with a computer and network
connection to broadcast opinions and thoughts worldwide.27 The resulting
erasure of the lines defining race and wealth creates a truly democratic
forum. Nongovernmental and political organizations also discovered the
Internet’s usefulness in championing lesser known causes because it
provides a cheap and effective means of reaching target audiences.28 Even
today, some believe democracy will come to China through the inherent
properties of the Internet; a generation of Chinese citizens growing up
with the ability to exercise unrestricted public speech online every day
will set the foundation for a more democratic society. 29

by science fiction author William Gibson. WILLIAM GIBSON, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NEW
MEDIA 112 (2003). He defined cyberspace as a “consensual hallucination.” WILLIAM
GIBSON, NEUROMANCER 5 (1984).
23. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 831.
24. Id. at 832.
25. As John Perry Barlow, cofounder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, put it
in 1996, “We will create a civilization of the Mind in Cyberspace. May it be more
humane and fair than the world your governments have made before.” See John Perry
Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace (Feb. 8, 1996), http://homes.
eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html. Barlow’s widely circulated sixteen-paragraph
Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace captures the early fascination and
excitement of the Internet. Id.
26. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 834; see also Elizabeth A. Ritvo, Online Forums and
Chat Rooms in Defamation Actions, 24 COMM. LAW. 1 (2006) (explaining how the
hearsay exceptions can aid plaintiffs in admitting defamatory chat room statements as
evidence).
27. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 838.
28. See id. at 842–43. Presidential candidate Howard Dean raised more money
than any other Democratic candidate. His fundraising success came as a result of his
supporters on the political websites Meetup.com and Moveon.org. See Gary Wolf, How
the Internet Invented Howard Dean, WIRED, Jan. 2004, at 138, available at http://www.
wired.com/wired/archive/12.01/dean_pr.html. Even the United States government uses
the Internet for military recruitment. The Marines use MySpace, a popular social
networking site among teenagers and young adults, to direct visitors to its recruitment
centers. Their site is located at http://www.myspace.com/themarinecorps (last visited
Mar. 14, 2008).
29. Clive Thompson, Google’s China Problem (and China’s Google Problem),
N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 23, 2006, at 156.
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B. United States Internet Regulations
Unfortunately, this new medium for free speech ushered in a new era
of exploitation.30 In the United States, the Internet led to the proliferation of
child pornography, 31 the defamation of corporations and individuals, 32
and the unmasking and subsequent punishment of anonymous writers. 33
Congress responded to these unforeseen issues by encouraging the
privatization of parts of the Internet, effectively bringing those parts
outside the reach of the First Amendment. 34 To protect the American
public, Congress passed laws regulating the public aspects of the Internet.
However, the Supreme Court has consistently used the First Amendment
to strike down these statutes.
To ban online access to child pornography and to protect minors from
“indecent” and “patently offensive” materials, Congress passed the
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA).35 The CDA criminalized
the use of a computer to display or send comments, images, or

30. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 824, 844.
31. For an overview of the difficulties in enforcing child online pornography in the
United States and overseas, see Alexander Shytov, Indecency on the Internet and
International Law, 13 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 260 (2005) (discussing differences in
laws, culture, and opinions between countries as to how best to deal with online child
pornography).
32. Websites such as Don’t Date Him Girl, http://www.dontdatehimgirl.com/
home/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2008), allow users to warn others about bad dates, often
identifying the date by real name or screenname. A Pittsburgh resident sued the site for
defamation after users labeled him a homosexual and a carrier of sexually transmitted
diseases. On April 5, 2007, a Pennsylvania court dismissed his case for lack of
jurisdiction. See Memorandum and Order of Court, Hollis v. Joseph, No. GD06-012677
(Pa. D. & C. Apr. 5, 2007), available at http://howappealing.law.com/ 2007040910031
8184.pdf; see also Lizette Alvarez, (Name Here) is a Liar and a Cheat, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
16, 2006, at G1.
33. Perhaps the most well-known anonymous website on the workings of the
federal judiciary, Underneath Their Robes, turned out to be the work of an assistant
United States attorney. Once his identity was discovered, the site was removed. See
Adam Liptik, Mystery of Gossipy Blog On the Judiciary Is Solved, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16,
2005, at A14.
34. See generally Dawn C. Nunziato, The Death of the Public Forum in
Cyberspace, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1115 (2005) (discussing the increasing regulations
on the previously unregulated areas in cyberspace of chat rooms and discussion boards).
35. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 849–50. Had it passed in its entirety, the CDA would
have been codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)–(h). Id. at 827 n.1. However, the court only
struck out the offending provisions; the other parts of the CDA were signed into law and
are scattered throughout the Code.
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communications deemed patently offensive, as determined by contemporary
community standards. 36
On the day President Clinton signed the CDA into law, the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and eighteen other mostly nonprofit
organizations filed suit claiming that the statute violated the First
Amendment’s right to freedom of speech.37 The case went to the Supreme
Court where the plaintiffs ultimately prevailed. The Court, troubled by
the lack of definitions for the terms indecent and patently offensive, and
by the government’s use of the terms interchangeably in the statute,
ultimately ruled these sections of the CDA to be overly broad and
therefore unconstitutional. 38
In making its ruling, the Court relied on the opinion of the district
court, 39 which in turn relied heavily on this nation’s historical deference
to First Amendment rights. 40 The district court found the CDA was not
narrowly tailored to warrant such a “patent intrusion on a substantial
category of protected speech for adults.”41 The “loss of First Amendment
freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes
irreparable injury.” 42
This deference to First Amendment rights continued in Ashcroft v.
ACLU. 43 In response to the defeat of the CDA, and to answer
continuing public concern regarding online child pornography, Congress
passed the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) in 1998. 44 Ashcroft v.
ACLU involved COPA’s criminalization of those who knowingly posted
36. Id. at 829.
37. Id. at 827 n.2. In addition to the ACLU, the plaintiffs included Human Rights
Watch, Electronic Privacy Information Center, Electronic Frontier Foundation, Stop
Prisoner Rape, AIDS Education Global Information System, Planned Parenthood,
Journalism Education Center, and many more. Id.
38. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 at 870–71 (1997). Compare 47 U.S.C. § 223
(2003), with 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2000) (demonstrating Congress amended the CDA in 2003
to remove the offending sections).
39. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844
(1997).
40. This deference is present in prior court opinions. The Supreme Court has
stated that “in spite of the probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties are . . .
essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of citizens of a
democracy.” New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964) (quoting Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940)).
41. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 855 (agreeing with plaintiffs that a ban on patently
offensive materials would hinder campaigns against genital mutilation and prison rape).
42. Id. at 851 (citing New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)).
43. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004).
44. 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2000), invalidated by ACLU v. Gonzales, 478 F. Supp. 2d
775 (E.D. Pa. 2007). The legislative findings in COPA state: “[T]he protection of the
physical and psychological well-being of minors by shielding them from materials that
are harmful to them is a compelling governmental interest.” Child Online Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 1402, 112 Stat. 2681-736 (1998).
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online content harmful to minors for commercial purposes. 45 Unlike the
CDA, COPA defined commercial purpose and allowed an affirmative
defense to those who use specified means to prevent minors from
accessing a particular website. 46 Even these details, however, failed to
satisfy the Supreme Court. Despite an affirmative defense, speakers may
still censor themselves rather than face possible prosecution, resulting in
“extraordinary harm” and causing a “serious chill upon protected
speech.” 47
This clash between restricting child exploitation on the Internet and
preserving the Internet’s promise as a forum for free speech continues
today. The House of Representatives recently introduced the Deleting
Online Predators Act of 2007 (DOPA). 48 DOPA would force federally
funded libraries to block any “commercial social networking website or
chat room,” ideally to prevent students from entering into chat rooms at
school and potentially conversing with sexual predators. 49 Like the
CDA and COPA, however, DOPA’s main problem may be its broad
definition of “commercial social networking sites.” 50 This bill may or
may not move on to the Senate to continue the debate. 51
45. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 659–60.
46. 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(2). “Specified means” include restricting access to minors
by requiring any of the following: a credit card, debit account, adult access code, digital
certificate verifying age, or “any other reasonable measures that are feasible under
available technology.” Id. § 231(c)(1).
47. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 671. The Court agreed with the Third Circuit’s decision
in finding that COPA was not the least restrictive means of protecting minors from
harmful websites but remanded the case for proceedings consistent with the reasoning of
the Court. Id.
48. Deleting Online Predators Act of 2007, H.R. 1120, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007)
(“[O]ne in five children has been approached sexually on the Internet.”).
49. Id. § 3(b)(i)(II). Common social networking sites include MySpace.com,
http://www.myspace.com (last visited Mar. 14, 2008), and Facebook.com,
http://www.facebook.com (last visited Mar. 14, 2008). In 2006, MySpace had an
estimated worth of $2 billion. Andrew Ross Sorkin & Peter Edmonston, Google Is Said
to Set Sights on YouTube, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2006, at C9. In October 2006, Yahoo!
reportedly offered to buy the less popular Facebook for $900 million. Saul Hansell,
Yahoo Woos Social Networking Site, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2006, at C1. On a side note,
Google has since acquired YouTube for $1.65 billion in stock. Yahoo! reportedly flirted
with the idea of buying YouTube but talks broke down. Saul Hansell, These Days No. 1
Portal Seems to be a Step Behind, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2006, at C1.
50. As defined in DOPA, commercial social networking sites allow the creation of
user-specific profiles to participate in forums and chat rooms. H.R. 1120 § 3(c)(J)(ii).
However, common websites hosted by Yahoo!, Amazon, and the New York Times all
allow users to create profiles and participate in online discussions. The passage of this
bill could block these sites from school libraries.
51. At the time of this Comment, the bill sits before the House Committee on
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The United States’ tolerance for racist or Nazi websites, in contrast to
foreign countries that censor these sites, further reflects the comparably
liberal free speech policy. 52 Perhaps as a result of this policy,
defamation law on the Internet remains an area largely unexplored by
the courts of this country. In Gertz v. Welch, the Court carved out an
exception to the right to free speech, protecting private individuals from
defamatory accusations. 53 However, lawsuits concerning defamatory
accusations on the Internet have only just begun to surface. 54 It appears
unclear whether the Court will treat defamation on the Internet in the
same manner as defamation in print media. 55

Energy and Commerce. MySpace, though, has taken the initiative to implement new
technology that will compare its user names with a registry of sex offenders in an
attempt to protect the minors who use MySpace’s services. Matt Richtel, MySpace.com
Moves to Keep Sex Offenders Off of Its Website, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2006, at C3. While
not a foolproof strategy, MySpace has at least shown Congress that private industry can
regulate itself.
52. A search for Nazi, white supremacist, or racist sites on a search engine targeted
at the United States audience (such as http://www.yahoo.com) will yield positive results,
whereas such a search on a French website (like http://www.yahoo.fr) will not.
53. See Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974) (differentiating between the
expectation of privacy between public figures and private individuals).
54. In Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick, an Australian citizen sued the American
company, Dow Jones, in Australia after an allegedly defamatory article appeared on the
Dow Jones’ subscriber-only website. (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575 (Austl.). Dow Jones
argued that because the defamatory materials were published on servers in the United
States, Australia lacked jurisdiction. Id. at 579. However, the High Court of Australia
disagreed, holding that the moment of publication occurred when Australian users
downloaded the materials from the server. Id. at 587–88. Thus, Australia had proper
jurisdiction and the court ruled in favor of Gutnick. The High Court further noted that it
is the place of the legislature to reform the common law of defamation. Id. at 600–01.
Absent action on that front, the High Court would apply the traditional legal doctrines
towards Internet cases. Id. at 607; see also Michael Saadat, Jurisdiction and the Internet
after Gutnick and Yahoo!, J. INFO. L. & TECH. (2005), available at http://www2.warwick.
ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/2005_1/saadat (considering the jurisdictional issues associated
with the Internet, particularly with respect to defamation). In contrast, the California
Supreme Court recently ruled that no provider or user of an interactive computer service
may be held liable for putting material authored by a third party on the Internet. Barrett
v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006). Specifically, the court held that individual
posters on websites, newsgroups, search engines, and blogs are protected under Section
230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996, which explicitly states that “[n]o
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” Id. at
522–23.
55. Professor Jack Goldsmith argues, “Cyberspace transactions are no different
from ‘real-space’ transnational transactions. They involve people in real space in one
jurisdiction communicating with people in real space in other jurisdictions in a way that
often does good but sometimes causes harm.” Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65
U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1250 (1998). However, Professor David Post emphasizes the
counter view that the jurisdictional questions raised by the Internet have no real world
counterpart and, as a result, traditional legal tools may not apply. David G. Post, Against
“Against Cyberanarchy,” 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1365, 1387 (2002).
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In instances where the public and private domains overlap, free speech
on the Internet is generally not protected. Employees that participate in
forums or maintain blogs to discuss work may be fired for their posts. 56
Courts grant little recourse in such situations, even if the employee’s
website does not discuss trade secrets but merely ridicules his boss. 57
Although unexplored in this country, a lawsuit from a fired blogger
against his employer has surfaced in France. 58 This is an area of law
that is undergoing development. 59
C. Internet Regulations in Other Countries
While the United States focused on regulations pertaining to child
pornography and free speech, other countries focused on protecting the
values embodied in their own cultures. Stemming from the Nazi
experience in World War II, French law prohibits Holocaust-denying,
racist, Nazi-apologetic, and hate speech websites.60 Germany has similarly
tough laws against racist, anti-Semitic, and white supremacist sites. 61
Reflecting the teachings of modesty in women in Islam, Saudi Arabia
blocks sites considered harmful to Muslim culture and values. 62 The
56. A number of bloggers have been fired for blogging at work. See, e.g.,
Statistics on Fired Bloggers, http://morphemetales.wordpress.com/2006/10/09/statisticson-fired-bloggers (Oct. 9, 2006). The international community has only begun to
address this issue. In France, a British woman who was fired for maintaining a personal
blog at work won her case in French court. See Bobbie Johnson, Briton Sacked for
Writing Paris Blog Wins Tribunal Case, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 30, 2007, at 20.
57. Companies fear employees will inadvertently disclose trade secrets. See, e.g.,
Vincent Chiappetta, Employee Blogs and Trade Secrets: Legal Response to Technological
Change, 11 NEXUS: J. OPINION 31 (2006). The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) is
a public interest law firm that champions constitutional rights in cases involving the
Internet and provides a guide on blogger’s rights. See How to Blog Safely (About Work
or Anything Else) (May 31, 2005), http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Anonymity/bloganonymously.php.
58. See Angela Doland, Sacre Blog! Fired Gossip Sues in Paris, CHI. TRIB., July
21, 2006, at 19.
59. An exploration of relevant domestic cases can be found in Konrad Lee, AntiEmployer Blogging: Employee Breach of the Duty of Loyalty and the Procedure for
Allowing Discovery of a Blogger’s Identity Before Service of Process is Effected, 2006
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 2, ¶¶ 29–42, http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/
2006dltr0002.html.
60. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d
1199, 1202–03 (9th Cir. 2006).
61. See Amber Jene Sayle, Net Nation and The Digital Revolution: Regulation of
Offensive Material for a New Community, 18 WIS. INT’L L.J. 257, 268–70 (2000).
62. These are primarily sites with a sexual theme. See Privacy International,
Silenced: An International Report on Censorship and Control of the Internet, Sept. 10,
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less than democratic societies of Bahrain, China, Iran, and North Korea
infamously censor any critique upon the ruling party. 63 Democratic
nations in areas of instability impose stricter Internet regulations in the
name of national security. 64
D. When Regulations Clash
The regulations of each country conflict with each other when
confronted by foreign websites, displaying materials legal in one country
but illegal in another. The ACLU court alluded to this quagmire, noting
that foreign materials are often stored on domestic servers but domestic
servers had no control over entering foreign content. 65 Currently no
international law defines and regulates material on the Internet. Even in
the realm of child pornography, an issue subject to universal disapproval,
governments face legal difficulties capturing overseas perpetrators. 66
In the realm of free speech, Germany’s and France’s laws against
online hate and racist speech clash with the free speech policies of the
United States. In the 1990s, Germany made numerous attempts to censor
foreign neo-Nazi websites.67 These attempts included pressuring commercial
providers to voluntarily censor material, threatening to sue foreign
Internet Service Providers (ISPs), and passing laws that expressly allowed
for the criminal prosecution of ISP executives. 68 This state-sponsored
censorship culminated in the indictment of the head of CompuServe
Germany on charges of trafficking child pornography and failing to block
neo-Nazi sites.69 Because CompuServe users could download pornography
and view otherwise illegal materials on the web, prosecutors charged the
executive with allowing users to circumvent the country’s ban on these
2003, http://www.privacyinternational.org/survey/censorship/Silenced.pdf. This report examines
the state of Internet censorship in various countries throughout the world.
63. Id. at 47. North Korea actually has no Internet Service Providers and only
permits “a handful of citizens” to go online. Id.; see Tom Zeller Jr., The Internet Black
Hole That Is North Korea, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2006, at C3.
64. See Yahoo! Inc., 433 F.3d at 1202–03.
65. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 848 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844
(1997).
66. Shytov, supra note 31, at 263–64.
67. See Informations- und Kommunikationsdienste-Gesetz—IuKDG [Information
and Communication Services Act], June 13, 1997, BGBl I at 1120, available at
http://bundesrecht.juris.de (amending Germany’s telecommunications law, including
censorship provisions, to hold internet service providers responsible for material which
appears on the Internet).
68. See Amber Jene Sayle, Net Nation and the Digital Revolution: Regulation of
Offensive Material For A New Community, 18 WIS. INT’L L.J. 257, 268–69 (2000).
69. Id. at 271. In the 1990s, CompuServe was a major player in the ISP industry,
competing with AOL. It has since been absorbed into AOL and does not operate under
“CompuServe.” See About CompuServe, http://webcenters.netscape.compuserve.com/menu/
about.jsp?floc=DCNav2 (last visited Mar. 14, 2008).
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materials. 70 The judge overturned the subsequent conviction, noting that
the executive was “a slave of the parent company.” 71
This clash of laws emerged again in France in 2000 in a series of cases
between Yahoo! and La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme
(LICRA). 72 Yahoo! maintains the portal www.yahoo.com for its users
in the United States. For its users elsewhere in the world, Yahoo! maintains
a separate site for each country, identified by the two-letter country
designation. For example, a user in France would access Yahoo! France
at fr.yahoo.com. However, nothing prevents a user in France from
entering www.yahoo.com and accessing content directed at United
States citizens, just as a user living in California can access fr.yahoo.com.
This case arose because French citizens used www.yahoo.com—aimed at
American users—to access auctions containing Nazi memorabilia—
banned on fr.yahoo.com—in other countries. 73 LICRA sued Yahoo! in
the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris (Court of Paris) alleging that
Yahoo! violated Article R645-1 of the French Criminal Code by
allowing French citizens access to these items through fr.yahoo.com. 74
The Court of Paris ordered Yahoo! to “take all necessary measures to
dissuade and make impossible any access” from Yahoo.com to any other
site that may be construed as an apology for Nazism or denial of the
Holocaust. 75 Further, the court agreed that France could prohibit

70. See Edmund L. Andrews, Germany Charges Compuserve Manager, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 17, 1997, at D19.
71. See Edmund L. Andrews, German Court Overturns Pornography Ruling
Against Compuserve, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1999, at C4.
72. See Yaman Akdeniz, Case Analysis of League Against Racism and
Antisemitism (LICRA), French Union of Jewish Students v Yahoo! Inc. (USA), Yahoo!
France, Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris (The County Court of Paris), Interim
Court Order 20 November, 2000 (2001), http://www.cyber-rights.org/documents/
yahoo_ya.pdf. The original court order in French and English translations are provided
in the Appendix to the Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre
Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (No. C-0021275JF).
73. See Akdeniz, supra note 72.
74. Id. Article R645-1 of the Penal Code prohibits the sale of any Nazi
propaganda or artifact. Id.
75. Id. Yahoo! countered that it directed its services towards United States users,
its servers were based in the United States, and this order would be “in contravention of
the First Amendment . . . which guarantees freedom of opinion and expression to every
citizen.” Alternatively, Yahoo! argued that it could not determine the geographic
location of every Yahoo! user. Id.
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Yahoo!’s acceptance of the objected items and websites based on the
“ethical and moral imperative shared by all democratic states.” 76
In January 2001, Yahoo! announced that it would ban all Nazi and Ku
Klux Klan memorabilia from its auction site, along with any other items
“associated with groups that promote or glorify hatred or violence.” 77
Although Yahoo! insisted it acted independently of the ruling in Paris, it
brought Yahoo! in line with French law.
Yahoo! returned to the United States and asked the court to declare the
French order unenforceable in the United States. 78 The court agreed,
holding that as sovereign nations, France and the United States may
freely make and enforce laws within their respective countries but need
not enforce the laws of another country. 79 The court stated that the
French regulations would be inconsistent with the First Amendment if
mandated by a court in the United States. 80
On appeal in the Ninth Circuit, the court reversed the decision, finding
that Yahoo! failed to show an actual violation of its First Amendment
rights. 81 The Court of Paris had ordered Yahoo! to block access to Nazi
and hateful memorabilia from French users alone. 82 American users,
however, are not targeted by this order. In effect, Yahoo! voluntarily
instituted a worldwide block on hate speech and references to Nazism. 83
The Ninth Circuit noted that “as to the French users, Yahoo! is
necessarily arguing that it has a First Amendment right to violate French
criminal law.” 84
These cases illustrate the clash between sovereign states’ interests in
protecting the values important to their citizens and the free-flowing
democratic nature of the Internet: no country willingly relinquishes its
borders. Further, international regulation as to issues concerning
extraterritoriality and the ill-defined boundaries of the Internet do not
exist. 85 As a result, a company could comply with the laws in its home
country, violate the laws in another, and be asked by its home country’s
court to censor materials around the world.
76. Id.
77. Yahoo! Inc., 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1185.
78. Id. at 1181.
79. Id. at 1194.
80. Id. at 1192.
81. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d
1199, 1224 (9th Cir. 2006).
82. Yahoo! Inc., 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1184.
83. See Yahoo! Inc., 433 F.3d at 1223.
84. Id. at 1221.
85. However, legal options in the international Internet commerce (e-commerce)
setting do exist. See Taipo Puurunen, The Judicial Jurisdiction of States Over International
Business-to-Consumer Electronic Commerce from the Perspective of Legal Certainty, 8
U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 133 (2002).
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E. The China Problem
To some extent, every country censors the Internet. 86 Even in the
United States, a search for “Kazaa” 87 on Google.com used to return a
notice informing users that certain search results had been removed in
order to comply with Kazaa’s lawsuit against Google pursuant to the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). 88 However, China has
emerged as the main offender in Internet censorship due to its broad
censorship of any “unhappy information” and its harsh consequences for
those who violate its censorship laws.89 Further, while users in democratic
countries may have the resources to circumvent the censorship laws of
their country, China and its authoritarian government successfully capture
and punish many who violate its censorship laws.
The introduction of the Internet in China granted its citizens a level of
freedom of communication that the government did not anticipate.
Realizing the potential for political upheavals, China passed a complicated
and intertwined set of regulations directed at ISPs and citizens alike for
the purpose of locating and removing dissidents. 90 In 2000, China’s
86. Chilling Effects is a website maintained by the Electronic Frontier Foundation.
It lists official government notices from various countries ordering material removed
from the Internet to comply with that country’s laws. The majority of complaints request
Google to remove websites posting materials that violate the DMCA. See Chilling
Effects, http://www.chillingeffects.org/internation/notice.cgi (last visited Mar. 14, 2008).
87. In early 2000, Kazaa emerged as a peer-to-peer file sharing network allowing
users to download copyrighted materials free of charge. See Press Release, Sharman
Networks, Content Industries and Sharman Networks Settle All Global Litigation (July
27, 2006), available at http://www.prnewswire.co.uk/cgi/news/release?id=176141. Kazaa
subsequently became the target of copyright infringement lawsuits but settled its cases in
2006. Kazaa Site Becomes Legal Service, BBC NEWS, July 27, 2006, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/5220406.stm.
88. The search of “Kazaa” on Google.com returns the result: “In response to a
complaint we received under the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act, we have
removed (8) result(s) from this page. If you wish, you may read the DMCA complaint
for these removed results.” Declan McCullagh, Google Pulls Links to Kazaa Imitator,
CNET NEWS, Sept. 2, 2003, http://www.news.com/2100-1032_3-5070227.html.
89. For a history of Chinese Internet regulations and the reasoning behind the
regulations, see Charles Li, Internet Content Control in China, 8 INT’L J. COMM. L. &
POL’Y 1 (2003).
90. See Greg Walton, China’s Golden Shield: Corporations and the Development
of Surveillance Technology in the People’s Republic of China, RIGHTS & DEMOCRACY,
2001, http://www.ichrdd.ca/english/commdoc/publications/globalization/goldenShieldEng.html
(exploring current and future Internet regulations in China, including electronic
surveillance and censorship). According to the United States Department of State, China
is also planning to implement an “email filtration system” that can track and monitor
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Ministry of Public Service launched the Golden Shield project, aimed at
promoting “the adoption of advanced information and communication
technology to strengthen central police control, responsiveness, and
crime combating capacity to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of
police work.” 91 The Golden Shield encapsulates these regulations. It
envisions the Internet as a mass surveillance tool, promising immediate
Internet access to its citizens and increased police security in exchange
for the ability to monitor every citizen. 92 To date, the Golden Shield project
allows the Chinese government to track up to 162 million Chinese
Internet users. 93 Apart from legal regulations, China also censors the
Internet through technology, as evidenced on September 3, 2002. On
that date China blocked all access to Google, a popular search engine. 94
In the same way users of Yahoo! France could access materials aimed at
American users yet banned in France through Yahoo!, Chinese users of
Google could access information about banned topics through sites
based in other countries. 95 However, because the search engines had no
physical offices inside China, China lacked legal authority to charge
these search engines with violations of Chinese law. 96 To prevent its
citizens from accessing illegal materials, China simply blocked the search
engines. 97 Fortunately, China eventually lifted this block as a result of
heavy global opposition to this new policy. 98
individual email accounts. U.S. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR,
U.S. DEPT OF STATE, 1999 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES—CHINA
(2000), available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1999_hrp_report/
china.html [hereinafter U.S. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY].
91. Walton, supra note 90. The Golden Shield is a collection of regulations,
divided in many stages, aimed at allowing China instant access to the registration of
records of each citizen. Leaders also envision cameras at every intersection to improve
police response time but also to aid in electronic surveillance of its citizens. Id.
92. Id.
93. China’s state network information center, China Internet Network Information
Center (CNNIC), released its 2007 survey of Chinese Internet use. The CNNIC found
over thirty-seven million rural users and approximately 125 million urban users. Thus,
the Golden shield has the potential of monitoring over 162 million citizens. See CNNIC,
STATISTICAL SURVEY REPORT ON THE INTERNET DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA (2007),
http://cnnic.cn/download/2007/20thCNNICreport-en.pdf. China installed “black boxes”
on Chinese Internet service providers to monitor activity within individual email
accounts. China also plans on developing technology that can detect and delete
“unwanted” emails without the recipient’s knowledge or consent. U.S. BUREAU OF
DEMOCRACY, supra note 90.
94. Thompson, supra note 29, at 67–68.
95. Banned topics included any reference to Tiananmen Square, Tibet independence,
and the Falun Gong, a group China considers a religious cult. Id. at 66, 68.
96. Id. at 68.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 71. In Who Controls the Internet?, Professors Jack Goldsmith and Tim
Wu argue that the effect of global influence on Chinese telecommunications and security
policy may be greatly exaggerated or misinterpreted by Western media. JACK GOLDSMITH &
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Despite this retreat, the since dubbed “Great Firewall of China” 99 has
continually adapted to rapidly changing technology; each new attempt to
circumvent the wall is met with equally dedicated programmers on
China’s side denying access. 100 The firewall operates on multiple levels
of filtration, based on a blacklist of sites and filtered words, as well as
filtration based on the originating location and final destination of
incoming information. 101 Certain sites that are either difficult to filter or
contain large amounts of user-created personal content are blocked
completely. 102 Further, China’s censorship lacks transparency because
the government does not distribute a list of censored topics, nor does the
government even admit to censorship efforts.103 Thus, China has
introduced an element of psychological pressure on its citizens to censor
themselves as they deem appropriate. Of course, a citizen who violates
the vague censorship laws faces legal penalties and perhaps more.
The Chinese realize that their government enforces its censorship laws
through the physical punishment of citizens who use the Internet for
disapproved purposes. According to Amnesty International, China has
imprisoned at least fifty-four citizens for wrongful Internet activity under
the country’s broad interpretation of its Golden Shield regulations.104

TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD 89 (2006).
In fact, China blocks and filters only what it deems fit. Id. As a result, a “government’s
failure to crack down on certain types of Internet communication ultimately reflects a
failure of interest or will, not a failure of power.” Id.
99. The phrase “Great Firewall of China” first appeared as the title of an article in
WIRED magazine, bringing public attention to Chinese Internet censorship. See Geremie
R. Barme & Sang Ye, The Great Firewall of China, WIRED, June 1997, available at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/5.06/china.html.
100. OpenNet Initiative provides a very technological examination of China’s
Internet censorship capabilities. OpenNet Initiative, Internet Filtering in China in 2004–
2005, http://www.opennetinitiative.net/studies/china/ONI_China_Country_Study.pdf. OpenNet
Initiative is a collaborative partnership between three universities which address the
increased regional control of the Internet. For a list of banned topics and blacklisted
sites, see Thompson, supra note 29, at 68.
101. Thompson, supra note 29, at 68.
102. An example includes the user-created online encyclopedia Wikipedia. Id. at
156. Recently, China relaxed its ban on the English version of Wikipedia. The Chinese
version remains inaccessible. Noam Cohen, Chinese Government Relaxes Its Total Ban
on Wikipedia, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2006, at C6.
103. OpenNet Initiative, supra note 100, at 52.
104. According to Amnesty International, China also has the largest recorded
number of imprisoned journalists and cyber-dissidents in the world. Furthermore, those
in prison, like Shi Tao, are reportedly forced to work in harsh conditions and their
relatives are questioned daily by police. See Amnesty International, Undermining
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In April 2005, Chinese journalist Shi Tao received a sentence of ten
years in prison for an email he authored summarizing a meeting on state
propaganda.105 The case garnered worldwide attention because an American
corporation, Yahoo!, facilitated Shi Tao’s arrest. 106 Because he sent the
email from his Yahoo! account, China requested, and Yahoo! Hong
Kong delivered, information on Shi Tao’s location.107 Before this incident,
prominent United States companies had always provided the technology
behind China’s Golden Shield. 108 These companies had also long complied
with the censorship laws of the particular country. 109 However, this was
the first instance in which a United States company’s voluntary
compliance with censorship law led directly to the imprisonment of a
citizen whose only crime was the exercise of free speech.
In January 2006, attention turned from Yahoo! to Google when
Google announced a second version of its search engine specifically for
Chinese citizens. 110 Located at Google.cn, this search engine would
fully comply with China’s censorship laws, erasing links to all sites on
the Falun Gong, Tiananmen Square, and anything else banned by the
government.111 Previously, no one nation, business, or person could control
the Internet. With Google’s help, China solved this conundrum by creating
a second Internet, a Chinese Internet, which lies completely within Chinese
control. 112 Notably, unlike other regimes mentioned before, China is not
trying to censor the Internet by blocking technological progress. Instead it
seeks to build and control a technologically advanced, highly sophisticated
Freedom of Expression in China 15–16, July 2006, http://web.amnesty.org/library/
Index/ENGPOL300262006.
105. Id at 15. For general technology-related human rights violations in China,
such as jailing citizens who use the Internet to voice criticism at the government, see
Human Rights in China, http://www.hrichina.org/public/contents/category?cid=8535
(last visited Mar. 14, 2008).
106. Amnesty International, supra note 104, at 15.
107. Id. China’s Golden Shield laws do not apply to Hong Kong or Macau; as
special administrative regions they operate under their own respective legal systems. See
Keith Bradsher, Chinese Provinces Form Regional Economic Bloc, N.Y. TIMES, June 2,
2004, at W7 (“Hong Kong and Macau have been special administrative regions of China
since Britain handed over Hong Kong in 1997 and Portugal returned Macau in 1999.”).
108. These companies include Cisco Systems and Nortel Networks for hardware,
Microsoft for software, and Google and Yahoo! for search engine capabilities. See
Thompson, supra note 29, at 155; see also Walton, supra note 90.
109. Yahoo! changed its policies to comply with French law. Akdeniz, supra note
72, at 4.
110. Thompson, supra note 29, at 154–55.
111. Id. at 86, 154.
112. While Google operationally controls the actual search engine, China through
its firewall controls the output of that search engine. Furthermore, many saw this second
search engine, Google.cn, as a renunciation of Google’s motto of “do no evil,” because
the corporation chose to profit at the expense of human expression in a country notorious
for its human rights violations. Id. at 155.
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second Internet. The emergence of this second Internet, coupled with
the inextricable role of American corporations in providing China with
the infrastructure to restrict Internet access, motivated Congress to call
the executives into that infamous hearing in February 2006.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A. Global Online Freedom Act 113
On February 16, 2006, after the acrimonious hearing in the House of
Representatives, Representative Christopher Smith (R-NJ) introduced
the Global Online Freedom Act of 2006. While that bill never became
law, it was reintroduced in similar form on January 5, 2007 as the Global
Online Freedom Act of 2007 (Act). 114 This Act aims to “promote
freedom of expression on the Internet [and] to protect United States
businesses from coercion to participate in repression by authoritarian
foreign governments . . . .” 115 The Act hopes to accomplish this goal
through: (1) promoting global internet freedom; (2) creating minimum
corporate standards for online freedom; and (3) establishing export
controls for Internet-restrictive countries. 116 Secretary of State
113. The Global Online Freedom Act is not an original creation. On January 7,
2003, Christopher Cox (R-Cal.) and Tom Lantos (D-Cal.), among others, introduced the
Global Internet Freedom Act. See H.R. 48, 108th Cong. (2003), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c108:H.R.48:. Although identical in purpose to
this Act, it would accomplish the goals through consultation with the United Nations and
by funding technologies aimed at concealing a user’s physical location. H.R. 48, 108th
Cong. § 5(2)–(3). Analysis of the Global Internet Freedom Act is provided by Elaine M.
Chen, Global Online Internet Freedom: Can Censorship and Freedom Co-Exist, 13
DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 229 (2003). This bill was reintroduced in similar form on
February 14, 2006. See H.R. 4741, 109th Cong. (2006).
114. See Global Online Freedom Act of 2006, H.R. 4780, 109th Cong. (2006);
Global Online Freedom Act of 2007, H.R. 275, 110th Cong. (as reported by H. Comm.
on Foreign Affairs on Dec. 10, 2007).
115. H.R. 275. Other purposes include promoting the free flow of information and
deterring United States businesses “from cooperating with officials of Internet-restricting
countries in effecting the political censorship of online content.” Id. § 101(2)–(3).
116. See id. §§ 101(2), 104(b)(6). As part of the bill, Congress also makes the
following findings:
Authoritarian foreign governments such as the Governments of Belarus, Cuba,
Ethiopia, Iran, Laos, North Korea, the People’s Republic of China, Tunisia,
and Vietnam, among others, block, restrict, and monitor the information their
citizens try to obtain. . . . Technology companies in the United States that
operate in countries controlled by authoritarian foreign governments have a
moral responsibility to comply with the principles of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights. . . . Technology companies in the United States have
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Condoleezza Rice has already established the Office of Global Internet
Freedom, which will oversee implementation of the Act and set policy.117
Under the Act, the President shall designate Internet-restrictive
countries each year. 118 United States businesses cannot locate, within a
designated Internet-restricting country, any electronic communication
containing personally identifiable information, nor process or store such
information by remote computing service facilities.119 Further, the businesses
cannot alter the operation of their search engines at the request of the
foreign officials of any Internet-restricting country. 120 Information on
communications with foreign officials, concerning censorship or terms
to filter, must be turned over to the Office of Global Internet Freedom. 121
Any business that violates the provisions of this bill faces civil and
criminal penalties. 122
At present, few obstacles stand in the way of the Act’s passage. The
Act holds bipartisan support and numerous human rights organizations
have endorsed its passage.123 In particular, Amnesty International launched
an official website with the purpose of supporting and promoting the
Act. 124 Furthermore, the anticipated rise of China as an economic
power, coupled with China’s often antidemocratic policies, create the
perfect political environment for anti-China legislation. 125
provided technology and training to authoritarian foreign governments which
have been used by such governments in filtering and blocking information
that promotes democracy and freedom.
Id. § 2(5), (11), (13).
117. See Press Release, United States Department of State, Secretary of State
Establishes New Global Internet Freedom Task Force (Feb. 14, 2006), available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/61156.htm.
118. H.R. 275 § 105(a)(1)–(2). The Act provides no specific criteria in determining
which countries qualify as Internet-restrictive.
119. Id. § 201.
120. Id. § 202(a).
121. Id. §§ 203, 204.
122. Id. § 206. Monetary penalties range between $10,000 to $2,000,000 depending
on the extent of the violation, and criminal penalties include imprisonment of up to five
years. Id.
123. As of January 27, 2008, four Republican and four Democratic congressmen
have cosponsored the bill with Congressman Smith (R-NJ). Library of Congress,
THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:H.R.275: (last visited Mar. 14,
2008).
124. See Irrepressible, http://irrepressible.info (last visited Mar. 14, 2008). Users
may download briefings on Internet repression on China and join a campaign against
general Internet repression.
125. American corporations outsource labor to China because they can pay Chinese
workers less than American workers and do not need to abide by stringent American
labor laws. However, this has caused a backlash in the United States and has created a
negative sentiment towards China as more and more jobs disappear overseas. See Matt
Richtel, Outsourced All the Way, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2005, at C1; Steven Greenhouse, As
Factory Jobs Disappear, Ohio Town Has Few Options, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2003, at A1.
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Despite the Act’s overwhelming support, some concerns remain:
(1) whether this oversight by the United States State Department will
cause Chinese citizens to distrust American corporations; (2) whether
Congress should redefine the very way American corporations function
abroad, that is, by forcing United States companies to move all Internetrelated hardware out of Internet-restrictive countries; and (3) whether the
United States should unilaterally set global Internet law. 126
The first concern, whether Chinese citizens will distrust American
corporations, arises from the Act’s requirement that all communications
by foreign officials discussing terms subject to filtering and censorship
be delivered to the U.S. State Department. 127 In addition, even though
United States companies must store personally identifiable information
outside China, they nonetheless continue to have unlimited access to
Chinese user information. Section 203 thus casts all American Internet
companies operating in China as potential spies.
The Act also further strengthens the positions of Chinese companies.
First, the Act cannot apply to Chinese companies because Chinese
companies follow Chinese, not American, law. In fact, Chinese companies
will comply with Chinese censorship law. Second, Chinese citizens do
not lack technological alternatives. China’s Baidu.com, another search
engine, has a fifty-eight percent market share in China, compared to
Google’s twenty-three percent. 128 If Chinese users discover that American
companies such as Google may disclose personal, private information to
a foreign government, citizens will choose Chinese companies and
censorship will prosper as such companies will fully comply with
censorship laws.
The second critique of the Act focuses on the requirement that
American companies not process or store personally identifiable information
within Internet-restrictive countries, possibly resulting in the movement

126. To even address these concerns, we must first assume Chinese citizens will
continue to use American search engines after the Act passes and the Chinese public
becomes aware of its implications.
127. H.R. 275 § 203.
128. Loretta Chao, China’s Baidu, Sky High, Still Rates ‘Buy’: Even as Price,
Competition Soar, Popular Web Site is an Analyst Favorite, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 2007,
at C3. American search engines are not the only companies with Chinese competitors:
China’s Huawei is the country’s equivalent to Cisco Systems or Nortel Networks in
Internet hardware production. In fact, Cisco sued Huawei for copyright infringement.
Press Release, Cisco Systems Inc., Cisco Files Lawsuit Against Huawei Technologies
(Jan. 23, 2003), available at http://newsroom.cisco.com/dlls/corp_012303.html.
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of all Internet-related-hardware outside the borders of such countries. 129
This provision may alter the way the majority of American companies
operate overseas in the affected countries, by forcing the companies to
not house servers in those countries.
The greatest criticism of the Act questions whether the United States
government should set Internet law worldwide. The Act runs straight
into the black hole of international jurisdiction. No law dictates the
enforcement of foreign judgments, much less resolves conflict between
differing Internet regulations. By passing the Act, or an act with similar
provisions, the United States draws first blood in this battle. Disregarding
the barriers of sovereignty, the Act allows the United States to control
businesses operating in another country. Closer to home, it is akin to a
California state law applying in Nevada to Nevada citizens.
In addition, the drafters of the Act focused on the situation in China
but neglected to examine the long-term global consequences of the Act.
Even assuming the Act halts the censorship and persecution of dissident
activists in China, with this precedent, European countries could pass
equally intrusive laws aimed at the American subsidiaries of French
companies. For example, as a result of precedent set by the Act, French
law could force French companies operating in America to turn over
information on all users who enter neo-Nazi search terms.
Aside from these criticisms, the Act also presents two pressing issues:
(1) the plight of Chinese Internet users; and (2) the lack of international
Internet regulations. In the absence of fruitful international action, the
United States should take a leadership role and propel the discussion on
resolving these problems. Perhaps the best way to initiate this discussion is
by passing and enforcing an act that forces these issues upon the
international community. Although unilateral action would certainly
raise the importance of crafting lasting solutions to these issues, this
action alone does not provide an immediate solution to a problem that
affects Chinese citizens today. For that reason, independent of the
passage of the Act, the United States should implement other short-term
solutions.
B. No Public Regulation
Most simply, the United States can ignore China’s use of American
corporations to administer state-sponsored censorship and dispose of any
129. H.R. 275 § 201. In contrast to the Act, the Department of Justice and the FBI
have contemplated rewriting United States wiretapping rules to require foreign ISPs to
place within United States borders all servers used for United States customers. See
Grant Gross, FBI Floats Wide-Ranging Wiretap Proposal, INFOWORLD, Sept. 14, 2006,
http://www.infoworld.com/article/06/09/14/HNfbiwiretap_1.html.
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plan of global Internet regulation. This choice to trust the Internet itself,
market forces, or the judiciary to come up with the “right solution” is
much less radical but much more complicated than it appears at first
glance.
Even with China’s stiff regulations, the mere presence of the Internet
in China expanded free speech opportunities for Chinese citizens. 130 For
example, message boards allow Chinese citizens to express their anger
over their government’s slow response to notify residents of harmful
contaminants in their drinking water. 131 Further, as long as the ordinary
citizen does not organize political protests, that citizen may chat, blog,
and even conduct business with strangers.132 Thus, even with the restrictions
they face, as a result of the Internet’s presence, Chinese citizens receive
information from the outside world and communicate with each other
more easily.
Moreover, the Chinese government lacks absolute control of information
because the Great Firewall, while complex in nature, has sprung leaks.
China does not employ citizens to surf the Internet and manually remove
websites. Rather, China relies on intricate filtering technology as well as
secrecy so that even Chinese companies must speculate as to which sites
are banned. 133 The technologically sophisticated may code their way
past the firewall—that is, until China’s programmers counter by patching
these holes. In addition, where the technology fails, information can bypass
the censors. 134 Unfortunately, users cannot predict which websites
pierce the firewall. However, relying on these leaks, supporters of
nonregulation believe that although some content would be filtered,
enough information would enter the country to enlighten the citizens and
bring democracy. 135 Further, if a Chinese citizen accesses unfiltered
130. See discussion supra Part II.E.
131. In late 2005, benzene spilled into the Songhua river in China. The citizens of
Harbin, a city in China, noticed the spill and the foul odor in their water supply, but the
local papers and city officials professed ignorance of the situation. See Jim Yardley,
Spill in China Brings Danger, Cover-Up and Wild Rumors, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2005,
at A1.
132. See Thompson, supra note 29, at 71, 155.
133. China can rely on “self-censorship” by companies because any misstep a
company may make will result in legal penalties or infliction of physical punishment.
See supra notes 89–100, 104–06, and accompanying text.
134. Some domain names are accessible while the URLs to those domains are
blocked. See supra note 100.
135. For instance, former President Bill Clinton once stated in a speech on
international relations, “We know how much the Internet has changed America, and we
are already an open society. Imagine how it could change China. Now there’s no
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material before the firewall catches this material, nothing stops this
citizen from distributing this material via cell phone or text message to
other concerned citizens. 136
In addition, modern day Chinese citizens appear aware but indifferent
to their country’s Internet censorship. 137 One scholar in China has noted
that most users can work, travel, speak privately, and surf online with
relative freedom, so that censorship itself does not disrupt daily life. 138
Citizens interviewed by the New York Times after the Google firewall
incident professed knowledge of the censorship but adopted a long-term
perspective, believing the government would ultimately fail in censoring
the Internet.139 Another Chinese citizen shared the belief of early scholars
worldwide that the Internet by itself plants the seeds for democracy in
Chinese youth. 140 For the ordinary Chinese citizen, Internet censorship
may not be so bothersome, as compared to the burdens of everyday life,
to inspire activism. 141
Although opting for no regulation is an easy and tempting path to take,
unfortunately China has neither relented nor shown signs of relenting in
its quest to restrict Internet access. China’s attempt at Internet regulation
cannot be compared to the failed attempts of France and Germany. In
fact, as evidenced by the fate of Shi Tao, China’s firewall has proven
more sophisticated, its police force more brutal, and its rules more
stringent than ever anticipated. Beyond the lives at stake lies the possibility
that China will completely control its Internet one day, blocking all
outside access from its citizens. As a result, the Internet cannot be
entrusted to bring democracy to China on its own.
The Internet has also failed to bring democracy to China through
market forces. Google chose to stay in China and comply with its
censorship laws to maintain a foothold in an immense potential market.
This is a choice echoed by non-Internet companies: to outsource
question China has been trying to crack down on the Internet—good luck. . . . That’s
sort of like trying to nail Jello to the wall.” Bill Clinton, Address at the Paul H. Nitze
School for Advanced International Studies at John Hopkins University (March 8, 2000)
(transcript available at http://canberra.usembassy.gov/hyper/2000/0308/epf302.htm).
136. Chinese citizens are increasingly using cell phone text messaging as a way of
passing information quickly, organizing protests, and bypassing censors. See Jim
Yardley, A Hundred Cellphones Bloom, And Chinese Take to the Streets, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 25, 2005, at A1.
137. The PBS documentary series Frontline has explored China’s censorship of its
political activists on the Internet and in print media. This particular episode contains
extensive interviews comparing Western views of China’s censorship with opinions by
Chinese scholars. Frontline: The Tankman (PBS television broadcast Apr. 11, 2006)
(transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tankman).
138. Li, supra note 89, at 37.
139. See Thompson, supra note 29, at 156.
140. Id. at 66, 156.
141. Id. at 156.

234

SHYU POST-AUTHOR PAGES.DOC

4/22/2008 1:33:43 PM

Speak No Evil

[VOL. 45: 211, 2008]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

manufacturing and service-oriented labor to China in the name of profit
and the promotion of shareholder value. As the largest potential customer
base in the world, market forces direct companies toward China, and
China requires the companies to comply with its laws. 142
Finally, if the United States government does not regulate the Internet,
the judiciary may develop common law to address the different situations.
However, as Justice Benjamin Cardozo so aptly put it:
We are not so provincial as to say that every solution of a problem is wrong
because we deal with it otherwise at home. The courts are not free to refuse to
enforce a foreign right at the pleasure of the judges, to suit the individual notion
of expediency or fairness. They do not close their doors, unless help would
violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of
good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal. 143

A court will not apply foreign law if it violates a fundamental principle of
domestic public policy. 144 In the United States, these fundamental
principles correspond to the values articulated in our Puritanical roots.
In other countries, these fundamental principles reflect different values
accorded by each culture. As a result, even if the judiciary develops
common law to address corporate responsibility for Internet censorship
abroad, other countries need to apply these laws. 145 This solution also
runs into old issues of United States imperialism and reopens grudges
between the Old World, New World, and developing countries.
C. Corporate Accountability
Responsibility for Internet regulation in China starts with the offending
corporations themselves. Those persons or entities that hold an American
corporation accountable can direct the corporation to change its policies
in China. Accountability exists when an agent is held to answer for

142. In 2005, China held the top spot in the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
Confidence Index for the third year in a row. GLOBAL BUSINESS POLICY COUNCIL, FDI
CONFIDENCE INDEX (2005), http://www.atkearney.com/shared_res/pdf/FDICI_2005.pdf.
The FDI measures long-term investments by a foreign entity into another country’s
economy. It represents investor confidence in the economy of any given country. In the
FDI index, India and the United States held second and third place, respectively. Id. at
1–2.
143. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 201–02 (N.Y. 1918).
144. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Disaggregated Sovereignty, in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 35, 53–54 (David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi
eds., 2005).
145. See id. (discussing the “principle of legitimate differences”).
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performance that involves some delegation of authority to act. 146 In that
sense, a corporation’s owners, its institutional and individual shareholders,
can direct corporate policy because owners are principals and officers
are agents of the corporation. But corporations in the United States must
also answer to those to whom they are indebted, such as their creditors
and customers. Finally, corporations are internally accountable to their
employees and externally accountable to any business entities with
which they have a working relationship, such as distributors and
suppliers. 147 One of the primary goals of a corporation is to increase
shareholder wealth by raising the price of the company’s stock so that
any actions with a deleterious effect on the current or projected stock
price of a company will motivate the company to take action.
Shareholders may hold a corporation accountable for its actions by
taking action to deter the corporation from engaging in the discouraged
activity. Most recently, as a result of Enron, Worldcom, and other scandals
involving elaborately falsified financial statements, shareholders demanded,
and Congress responded by imposing new regulations on all public
companies.148 In addition, institutional shareholders may use their substantial
voting power and leverage over a company’s share price to influence the
board of directors of an offending corporation. 149 Although individual
146. Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, Transnational Corporations and Public Accountability,
in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 144, at 110, 112.
147. See id. at 113–14.
148. In 2001, American energy giant Enron revealed that it had sustained its profits
as a result of massive internal accounting fraud. Enron subsequently filed the second
largest United States claim for bankruptcy in history. Richard A. Oppel, Jr., & Andrew
Ross Sorkin, Enron Corp. Files Largest U.S. Claim for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3,
2001, at A1. Thousands of employees lost not only their jobs but also their savings in
the now worthless Enron stock. See Kate Murphy, Enron’s Collapse: The Employees
Sent Home To Sit and Wait By the Phone, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2001, at C9. The ensuing
investigation pointed fingers straight at Enron’s auditors. See Alex Berenson, Enron’s
Collapse: Watching The Firms That Watch The Books, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2001, at C1.
After the American telecommunications company Worldcom revealed that it also
engaged in deceptive accounting practices and then declared the largest United States
claim for bankruptcy in history, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to promote
corporate governance and accountability. Simon Romero & Riva D. Atlas, Worldcom
Files for Bankruptcy; Largest U.S. Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2002, at A1; see Jeffrey N.
Gordon, Governance Failures of the Enron Board and the New Information Order of
Sarbanes-Oxley 3–5, 10–16 (Columbia Law Sch. Ctr. for Legal and Econ. Studies,
Working Paper No. 216, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=391363 (discussing
implications of Sarbanes-Oxley on future Enron-like situations).
149. California’s public pension fund, CalPERS, has “long sought ways to use the
power of its holdings to influence corporate behavior. Its trustees have argued that doing
so is a crucial part of their fiduciary duty, because insisting on good corporate
governance is likely to bring about more valuable shares.” Mary Williams Walsh,
Calpers Ouster Puts Focus On How Funds Wield Power, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2004, at
C10. In the 2004 election, however, CalPERS’s Democratic trustees came under attack
by Republicans, who claimed CalPERS puts social responsibility ahead of shareholder
value. Id.
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shareholders have little clout as compared to institutional investors, these
shareholders can destroy a company’s reputation in the media. 150 In
addition, individual shareholders may punish corporations through the
Finally, the individual
judicial system in shareholder lawsuits.151
shareholders can simply sell off their holdings.
Thus, the power to change the policies of these Internet companies lies
in the hands of their shareholders and business partners. To date, this
has not occurred—the stakeholders seem content with the direction these
companies have chosen. 152 Not surprisingly, shareholders enjoy having
a foothold in an immense potential economic market. 153
150. Corporations are finding it increasingly difficult to hide labor violations in
foreign countries from the American public. See Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social
Responsibility in an Era of Economic Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 736–37
(2002).
151. Several law review articles explore the possibility of shareholders holding
corporations responsible for human rights violations under the Alien Tort Claims Act
(ATCA). See Francisco Rivera, A Response to the Corporate Campaign Against the
Alien Tort Claims Act, 14 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 251, 276–77 (2003)
(acknowledging weaknesses to the ATCA approach but chastising corporations for
attacking the ATCA when no other better remedy exists and when corporations
themselves do not engage in corporate responsibilities); Saman Zia-Zarifi, Suing
Multinational Corporations in the U.S. for Violating International Law, 4 UCLA J. INT’L
L. & FOREIGN AFF. 81, 104–14 (1999) (applying the ATCA and justifying its use against
corporations engaged in human rights abuses); Beth Van Schaack, With All Deliberate
Speed: Civil Human Rights Litigation as a Tool For Social Change, 57 VAND. L. REV.
2305, 2345–47 (2004) (cautioning against potential backlash in ATCA lawsuits that may
result in a focus on litigation at the cost of forgetting the victims).
152. The tide may slowly be turning. Institutional shareholder Boston Common
Asset Management recently introduced a shareholder resolution requiring Cisco Systems
to specify the steps taken by the company to reduce the likelihood that its practices in
China may enable or encourage the violation of human rights. See Press Release, Boston
Common Asset Management, LLC, Human Rights and Internet Fragmentation Proposal
Receives Record Shareholder Support (Nov. 15, 2006), available at http://www.boston
commonasset.com/news/cisco-agm-111506.html. The resolution failed, but twenty-nine
percent of Cisco’s shareholders voted in its favor, up from eleven percent the year before
when the investment firm introduced the same resolution. Id. The shareholders voted
for the resolution despite vehement opposition by Cisco’s board, which includes Jerry
Yang, the president of Yahoo!. Press Release, Reporters Without Borders, Shareholders
Ask Cisco Systems to Account for its Activities in Repressive Countries (Nov. 17,
2006), available at http://www.rsf.org/article. php3?id_article=19782. In addition, the
New York City Pension Fund has targeted the shareholders of Google, Yahoo!, and
Microsoft with similar resolutions. The city’s pension fund has considerable financial
clout, owning nearly 400 million dollars worth of stock in the two companies. The
Yahoo! resolution received more than 15% of shareholder votes, with the Google and
Microsoft resolutions receiving 3.8% and 3.9% respectively. Press Release, William C.
Thompson, Jr., N.Y. City Comptroller, Thompson Pressures Yahoo! and Google to Establish
Policies Against Censorship (Jan. 31, 2008), available at http://www.comptroller.nyc.gov/press/
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Despite the reluctance of institutional shareholders to promote the
advancement of human rights, the general public can also hold corporations
accountable for their actions. 154 Because corporations touch so many
facets of society and because of their visibility in the public in general,
society has often called upon corporations to redefine the status quo.
For example, public groups have petitioned corporations to protect
workers’ rights, conform to environmental safety standards, and promote
the advancement of women and minorities in the workplace.155 Watchdog
organizations can also harm a company’s reputation and, in some cases,
affect that company’s practices overseas. 156
If Chinese and American corporations refuse to act to change the
status quo, the American and Chinese public may force these corporations
to take responsibility for their actions. 157 Already, news of Internet
censorship in the United States caused the legislature to initiate the

2008_releases/pr08-01-009.shtm. In January 2008, New York City Comptroller William
C. Thompson Jr. resubmitted the Yahoo! and Google resolutions on behalf of the fund.
Id.
153. Shareholder sentiment with regard to a specific element of corporate
philosophy may be difficult to quantify. Just as a citizen will vote for the election
candidate that best represents that citizen’s views, a shareholder will not oust the board
of directors if he or she disagrees with a part but not all of the of board’s philosophies.
154. Koenig-Archibugi, supra note 146, at 112.
155. Williams, supra note 150, at 736–40 (noting that after a negative publicity
campaign aimed at Nike’s labor practices, Nike has since become the picture of social
responsibility); see also Danny Hakim, Bicoastal Blues For G.M. and Ford, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 23, 2005, at C1 (“[T]he electoral party of [the ten states adopting California’s car
emission standards] . . . puts considerable pressure on automakers to develop more fuelefficient vehicles.”).
156. Even if an organization makes a wholly ridiculous claim against a corporation,
each accusation slowly erodes the company’s goodwill and adversely affects its stock
prices. Corporations may heed shareholders’ concerns over a decreasing or stagnant
stock price because the directive of a corporation is to increase shareholder value. For
example, constant criticism over Wal-Mart’s alleged choice of profits at the cost of
exploiting low-income workers has resulted in a stagnant stock price in recent years,
despite steadily increasing sales and profits. As a result, Wal-Mart now must examine its
corporate image. See Liza Featherstone, Wal-Mart’s P.R. War, SALON, Aug. 2, 2005,
http://dir.salon.com/story/news/feature/2005/08/02/walmart/index.html?pn=1 (distinguishing
the anti-Wal-Mart movement from other public outcries for corporate responsibilities, in
part because activists equate fighting Wal-Mart with opposing the current President and
also because of the willingness of the activists to engage politicians and pass legislation
against Wal-Mart); WAL-MART STORES INC., 2005 ANNUAL REPORT 15 (2005) (noting
frustration on the part of Rob Walton, Chairman of the Board of Directors: “It is
frustrating that over the last five years, our sales have gone up almost 83 percent, and our
earnings have grown almost 100 percent, but our stock price hasn’t moved.”).
157. Some publicly-traded Chinese companies are actually partially owned by the
state. For example, the Chinese government partially owns Baidu and Sina.net. Consequently,
if these companies succeed to Google’s share of the Chinese market, effective shareholder
oversight may be impossible to obtain.
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Global Online Freedom Act. 158 The media and public interest groups
such as Amnesty International now broadcast what they perceive to be
the wrongs of these companies on national news and on the front of
pages of prominent newspapers.159 This erosion of the reputation of these
companies and the call for accountability overseas by public interest groups
and by the media has begun. And if such erosion depresses the stock
prices of these companies, it will not be forgotten. Google’s loud
proclamations of philanthropy and its do-no-evil motto make it a
particularly vulnerable target. 160 Although the Google Foundation funds
research into environmentally friendly hybrid car engines, promotes
literacy, and fights poverty, it does nothing to aid the human rights
situation in China despite the situation’s close ties to Google’s overseas
operations.161 As a result, public groups should focus on Google’s ability to
remedy the human rights situation in China.
D. Proxy-Blocking Identity-Concealing Technology
The 2003 version of the Global Internet Freedom Act included a
promising proposal: the use of government-funded, proxy-blocking

158. Another possible, but highly theoretical, solution that Congress could employ
is to set the penalties associated with violating the Act at a level high enough to
significantly harm the company’s profits in China, but not so high as to deter the
company from exiting the market completely. The penalties must be set so that shareholders
would still profit, albeit very slightly, from their investment in the offending company.
As a result, the shareholder would not have an incentive to pressure the company to
withdraw because the shareholder would still benefit more financially from the
company’s presence in China than its absence and would instead pressure China to
change. A somewhat relevant example would be the European Union’s imposition of a
$600 million fine on Microsoft for breach of European antitrust regulations. Microsoft
had ample knowledge of the antitrust regulations, but the size of the market convinced
Microsoft to breach these regulations. Unlike the China situation, though, Microsoft’s
shareholders allowed Microsoft to remain in Europe. The idea behind the fines in the
Act would be to set recurring fines at a level that would force action. See Paul Meller,
Microsoft Pays Fine Imposed by Europe, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2004, at C7.
159. Many of the New York Times articles cited by this Comment appeared on the
front page. In particular, Clive Thompson’s piece, Google’s China Problem (and
China’s Google Problem), appeared on the front cover of the New York Times Magazine
on April 23, 2006. See generally source cited infra note 160; Thompson, supra note 29.
160. Google created the for-profit philanthropist group, the Google Foundation,
with $1 billion of seed money. Katie Hafner, Philanthropy Google’s Way: Not the
Usual, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2006, at A1.
161. See Google.org Homepage, http://google.org/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2008).

239

SHYU POST-AUTHOR PAGES.DOC

4/22/2008 1:33:43 PM

technology to tunnel past China’s censors. 162 In the United States,
proxy-blocking technology appeals to those users who wish to hide
personal information and conceal their Internet history as they navigate
through different websites. However, this technology can also circumvent
censors. It works as a middleman; instead of connecting directly to a
website, the middleman will take a user’s order and connect to the site
under the middleman’s name. 163 In this way, the visited site registers the
middleman’s identity and location, and the actual user remains largely
anonymous. Those monitoring the activities of the user will only see
connections going to and from the middleman. The use of government
funds to promote proxy-blocking software in Internet-restrictive countries
occurred in Iran. 164 There the United States enlisted Anonymizer, a
company specializing in Internet privacy technology, to promote free
speech and to protect Iranian Internet users from government
censorship. 165
In March 2006, Anonymizer announced it would take its technology
to China to help Chinese citizens circumvent the Chinese firewall. 166 In
China, Anonymizer faces two main problems. The first poses a conundrum:
how to spread word of a product to circumvent censors when the
government censors news of that product. Anonymizer and other similar
services rely on word of mouth within the Chinese community to solve
this problem. The technologically savvy and dedicated online bloggers
do not need commercial products to circumvent the firewall. Private
proxy servers perform the same function as Anonymizer. 167 Ideally,
these technologically savvy users would receive notice about other

162. This proposal did not make it into the 2006 or 2007 versions of the Act.
Compare H.R. 48, 108th Cong. (2003), with H.R. 4780, 109th Cong. (2006), and H.R.
275, 110th Cong. (2007).
163. The middleman’s name is actually the middleman server’s IP address. Justin
Boyan originally developed Anonymizer, a proxy-blocking service, in 1995. He
explains the history of Anonymizer, how it works, and its flaws on his website, The
Anonymizer, http://www.december.com/cmc/mag/1997/sep/boyan.html.
164. Hiawatha Bray, Beating Censorship on the Internet: Tools Mask User IDs,
Give Alternative Routes to Sites, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 20, 2006, at A10.
165. The Anonymizer, supra note 163; Bray, supra note 164.
166. Press Release, Anonymizer, Chinese Citizens Get Censor-Free Internet Through
Anonymizer (Mar. 31, 2006), available at http://www.anonymizer.com/consumer/media/
press_releases/03312006.html. Anonymizer previously worked with Voice of America
to develop similar technology for use in China. See Press Release, Anonymizer, Anonymizer
to Provide Censor-Free Internet to China (Feb. 1, 2006), available at http://www.anonymizer.
com/consumer/media/ press_releases/02012006.html.
167. A computer in a foreign country may be set up to act as a server, performing
the same function as Anonymizer in blocking a user’s identity. However, not all Chinese
citizens have access to private computers set up in foreign countries.
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commercial proxy-blocking services during their uncensored surfing and
spread word to the Chinese community. 168
The active intervention of the Chinese government presents Anonymizer’s
second problem. Once the government encounters a proxy-blocking
site, that site is shut down. Anonymizer, however, solves this issue
by maintaining a list of users and informing users each time the website
hosting the technology changes. 169 Ironically, China’s trust in its selfmaintaining firewall also aids Anonymizer, because China does not
employ people to search the Internet to manually remove offending sites.
Consequently, the hosting website need not change too frequently, but
only when caught by this firewall.
Although programs such as Anonymizer provide an efficient and
effective short-term solution to eluding China’s filters, these programs may
conflict with current American security concerns. Zero Knowledge, an
early rival to Anonymizer, shut its doors roughly a month after the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.170 Safeweb, another rival partially
funded by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, shut down its free site
shortly thereafter. 171 Although Zero Knowledge attributed its decision
to poor business, both sites had come under heavy criticism in the days
after the attacks for their potential ability to aid and abet terrorists in
communicating with each other anonymously. 172
Historically, anonymous speech played a vital role in the founding of
this country. 173 In more recent times, the Supreme Court has upheld the
168. Word can be spread either verbally, online, or via cell phone.
169. When Anonymizer for Chinese citizens was first released in March 2006, it
was located at http://www.xifuchun.com/. However, this site no longer exists. Only
Chinese users of this service know its current URL. See Press Release, Anonymizer
(Feb. 1, 2006), supra note 166.
170. Julie Hilden, The Death of Anonymous Speech on the Internet? How September 11
May Alter Our First Amendment Rights Online, FINDLAW, Nov. 29, 2001, http://writ.
news.findlaw.com/hilden/20011129.html.
171. Id. Safeweb has since been bought out by Symantec, and has discontinued its
services. See Safeweb, http://www.safeweb.com (last visited Mar. 14, 2008) (transferring
searches to the Symantec site).
172. See Hilden, supra note 170.
173. In the days preceding the American Revolution, political activists published
their views anonymously to avoid British retribution. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (“Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the
majority.”); see also id. at 360 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“There is little doubt that the
Framers engaged in anonymous political writing.”). Similarly, Alexander Hamilton,
John Jay, and James Madison published the Federalist Papers under the pseudonym
Publius. See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (“Even the Federalist Papers, written
in favor of our Constitution, were published under fictitious names.”). Even today,
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right of religious and political activists to express their views anonymously.174
However, as a result of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and
the revelation that the terrorists communicated with each other online,
anonymity on the Internet has begun to erode. 175
Investigations of terrorist organizations after the attacks on September
11 revealed the extent of terrorist dependence on the Internet. Terrorist
groups such as Al-Qaeda use the Internet for recruitment and promotion
of their activities. 176 These groups release videos of their exploits as
well as training materials for would-be terrorists online. 177 In addition,
terrorists communicate with each other in Internet chat rooms. 178
In the interest of protecting national security, President Bush granted
greater power to law enforcement officials. Five years after the attacks,
many of these actions still curtail the range of anonymous speech on the
Internet. For example, the renewal of the Patriot Act in 2005 also
extended the life of a provision that gave government agencies expanded
surveillance powers. 179 More famously, President Bush allegedly issued
an executive order authorizing the National Security Agency (NSA) to
eavesdrop on Americans inside the United States. 180 This warrantless
politicians and their staff members regularly communicate anonymously with the press.
Anonymous speech in politics is often necessary to preserve one’s public image. See
Mark Leibovich, Foley Case Upsets Tough Balance of Capitol Hill’s Gay Republicans,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2006, at A1 (“[M]any gay Republicans interviewed for this article . . .
would speak only anonymously for fear of adversely affecting their career.”).
174. See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton,
536 U.S. 150, 151–52 (2002) (holding an ordinance, requiring solicitors and canvassers
to obtain and display a permit prior to engaging in door-to-door solicitation, to be in
violation of the First Amendment); see also McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357 (weighing the
value of free speech against its misuse in political campaigning and holding that the state
cannot bar all anonymous election-related pamphleting).
175. See Jennifer B. Wieland, Note, Death of Publius: Toward a World Without
Anonymous Speech, 17 J.L. & POL. 589, 625–27 (2001) (noting that ISPs have agreed to
work with the government in an unspecified manner and that the FBI will now employ
technology to read encrypted Internet messages of suspected terrorists).
176. Hilden, supra note 170; Robert F. Worth, Jihadists Take Stand on Web, and
Some Say It’s Defensive, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2005, at A22.
177. Hilden, supra note 170.
178. See Worth, supra note 176.
179. The Patriot Act amended the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
(FISA). See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1805 (2000);
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senate Passes Legislation To Renew Patriot Act, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
3, 2006, at A14. On September 28, 2006, the House of Representatives passed a bill that
would “update” the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Electronic Surveillance
Modernization Act, H.R. 5825, 109th Cong. (as passed by House, Sep. 28, 2006).
180. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1. However, the Bush Administration insists that this
news report is grossly inaccurate. The investigation continues into whether the President
issued this executive order. The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), a public
policy group dedicated to protecting privacy and freedom of speech on the Internet, has
filed a lawsuit against the Department of Justice seeking documents relating to the order
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eavesdropping included reading the emails of any citizen linked, even
indirectly, to suspected terrorists. 181
Despite the threat to national security, the United States government
should not condemn the use of proxy-blocking services to aid Chinese
citizens in defeating censorship because proxy-blocking services appear
to be the best solution at this time. Many Chinese Internet users already
utilize this service to shield their identities. Further, Anonymizer allows
citizens to exercise free speech online absent fear of potential persecution
from their government. Because this promotion of online anonymous
speech may harm America’s national security, the United States
government is unlikely to fund this enterprise. Even if this service goes
against current United States domestic policy, this country cannot forget
its historical roots in anonymous speech, its worldwide place as the
champion of free speech, and the human lives at stake in China absent
this solution. Funding or not condemning the use of proxy-blocking
technology in China would be the best short-term solution.
E. International Internet Control
In 1999, the Hague Conference on Private International Law adopted
the preliminary draft of a treaty that would enforce judgments across
international borders. Notably, the treaty would include Internet
regulations. 182 However, despite fourteen years of negotiations, the
treaty remains unfinished with no end in sight. 183 Even if the treaty
materializes, member states may not endorse it without extensive
objections, if at all. In 2005, the Hague Conference finished the Convention
on Choice of Court Agreements. This scaled-down treaty, which excludes
common Internet issues such as copyright and intellectual property
issues, languishes unsigned by any member state. 184
of NSA surveillance. The complaint can be found on EPIC’s website at http://www.epic.
org/privacy/nsa/complaint_doj.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2008).
181. Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 180, at A16.
182. Proposed Hague Conference Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, http://www.
cptech.org/ecom/jurisdiction/hague.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2008) (preliminary drafts
and meeting minutes).
183. See id.
184. Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294,
available at http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php? act=conventions.text&cid=98. Under
this treaty, signatories agree to recognize and enforce judicial decisions reached by other
signatory states. Id.
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Fortunately, a treaty may not be necessary in this realm because the
Internet Corporations for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)
already functions as an international treaty organization. 185 ICANN is
the nonprofit entity in charge of assigning and managing domain names
and IP addresses, a function vital to the survival and organization of the
Internet.186 The ICANN concept emerged during the Clinton Administration
in response to the growing privatization of the Internet and the fear that
national governments would impose upon the global arena of the
Internet inconsistent or conflicting national laws. 187 As a result of its
birth in the United States, ICANN operates under a contract with the
Department of Commerce from ICANN’s headquarters in California. 188
All potential conflicts fall under California state law and the United
States government theoretically has the final word over ICANN’s
actions.189 However, the United States has never acted on this authority.190
The international community perceives this conflict of interest—the
mere possibility that one country could control the Internet—as
particularly unsettling. 191
However, ICANN’s position as the incumbent international Internet
regulatory agency may yet be salvageable. Professor Jonathan Weinberg
aptly notes that ICANN functions in many ways like an administrative
agency with a single exception. 192 Unlike administrative agencies,
185. The remarkable thing about ICANN is that it is an international body set to
solve international issues, but was created absent a treaty or international negotiation.
Milton Mueller, Dancing the Quango: ICANN and the Privatization of International
Governance 6 (Feb. 11, 2002), available at http://ischool.syr.edu/~mueller/quango.pdf.
186. Id. at 1.
187. Id. at 3. Ironically, the Act would impose laws that conflict with Chinese laws.
188. See Jonathan L. Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1974,
2032–33 (2006). For other private alternatives to ICANN, see Michael Froomkin,
Habermas@Discourse.net: Toward a Critical Theory of Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REV.
749, 798–817 (2003). To date, ICANN still operates from California. In fact, ICANN
held its last meeting in “its home town of Los Angeles.” 30th International Public
ICANN Meeting, http://losangeles2007.icann.org/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2008).
189. “Externally, ICANN is an organisation incorporated under the law of the State
of California in the United States. That means ICANN must abide by the laws of the
United States and can be called to account by the judicial system i.e. ICANN can be
taken to court.” About ICANN, http://losangeles2007.icann.org/icann (last visited Mar.
14, 2008).
190. Victoria Shannon, Other Nations Hope to Loosen U.S. Grip on Internet, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2005, at C14.
191. Id. In contrast, opponents of international control point to the supporters of
this proposal: the Internet-restrictive countries of China, Iran, and Syria, along with the
European Union and its member states. Id.
192. For example, ICANN appoints its own board of directors, which is not
accountable to the international community or general American public. See Jonathan
Weinberg, ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE L.J. 187, 235–36 (2000).
ICANN has no need to reach a consensus on its decisions and, in fact, will choose to
exclude the views of those who do not come from technological backgrounds. Id. at 249
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ICANN’s decisions are not subject to review by any independent body
other than ICANN itself.193 This only furthers criticism over the opaqueness
of ICANN’s decisions and fuels the international fear that the United
States controls the Internet because ICANN is based in the United
States.
Professor Weinberg does not suggest judicial review of ICANN’s
decisions but instead advises ICANN to gain legitimacy through its
substantive decisions and to decide technological questions while refraining
from setting policy. 194 Although wholly plausible, this suggestion seems
to entrust ICANN with the duty of building its own reputation in the
international community, when much of that community has already
formed its opinion against ICANN. 195 As Weinberg observes, ICANN
needs legitimacy and acceptance to accomplish its goals because
ICANN rests on a precarious perch and cannot afford to antagonize its
sponsoring government, important Internet companies, and sources of
funding. 196 It would be in ICANN’s interest to actively seek some type
of independent review of its rulings outside the United States to provide
the international community with at least the illusion of fairness and to
distance itself from the United States. By establishing itself as a
legitimate international Internet regulatory agency, ICANN can assist in
solving the Chinese Google problem.
(noting ICANN excludes “people with no understanding of ICANN”). According to
Weinberg, ICANN also sets policy and creates legal relationships. See id. at 223–24.
ICANN argues that it does not set policy, but performs a highly technological function—
the regulation of domain names. Yet, Weinberg counters, the very issues of
trademark dispute resolution and cybersquatting are at heart issues of policy that
concern technology and are not purely technological questions. Id. at 223. In addition,
to endorse its own legitimacy, ICANN has adopted three techniques of administrative
agencies: it publicized the techniques it follows in making policy rulings, developed a
formal procedure for review of the rulings, and adopted requirements of standing,
timeliness, and exhaustion with regard to the reviews of its rulings. Id. at 224.
However, ICANN cannot transform itself into an administrative agency because it still
does not answer to the United States government. Id. at 225–29.
193. Id. at 231–35. Weinberg also notes that no ICANN institution exists to
perform the function that judicial review performs for administrative agencies. Id. at
233.
194. See id. at 259–60.
195. See Jennifer L. Schenker, Nations Chafe at U.S. Influence Over the Internet,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2003, at C1.
196. Weinberg, supra note 192, at 255–56. “ICANN is the product of a somewhat
precarious bargain between the Internet technical hierarchy, a few major e-commerce
and telecommunications firms, the intellectual property interests . . . the European
Union, the US Department of Commerce, and one or two other national governments,
notably Australia.” Mueller, supra note 185, at 7.
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The United States and the international community itself fail to aid
ICANN in this endeavor. In September 2006, the United States Department
of Commerce renewed its three-year contract with ICANN.197 In exchange,
the United Nations created an Internet Governance Forum, aimed at
developing international Internet policy. 198 Despite being a promising
step in the creation of an international body, the majority of Internet
corporations are based in the United States, which is a direct result of the
Internet originating in the United States. 199 Although the United States’s
invention of the Internet does not grant the United States property rights
over the Internet, it does mean that efforts toward moving the Internet
under international control are likely to be stalled by the United States
and its army of Internet corporations. 200
F. China and the World Trade Organization
On December 11, 2001, China committed itself to the international
community when it became the one hundred and forty-third member of
the World Trade Organization (WTO). 201 In reaching this point, China
agreed to all WTO agreements, including the provisions requiring
application of Most Favored Nation (MFN) treatment. 202 Commentators
197. Joint Project Agreement Between the U.S. Department of Commerce and the
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (Sept. 29, 2006), http://www.
icann.org/general/JPA-29sep06.pdf. This move undermines the international community’s
belief that ICANN acts independently. Victoria Shannon, U.S. Loosens Its Control Over
Web Address Manager, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2006, at C4.
198. The Internet Governance Forum (IGF), http://www.intgovforum.org (last
visited Mar. 14, 2008) (providing IGF’s policy and current projects). The 2006 meeting
of the Internet Governance Forum focused on the use of non-Latin characters in domain
names. Some countries, China included, see the sole use of Latin characters in domain
names as an attack upon their culture. Victoria Shannon, A Web Conflict Centers On
Languages Used in Addresses, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2006, at C9.
199. Internet corporations refer to companies primarily engaged in Internet
infrastructure and content development.
200. The fact that the United States invented the Internet is not as important as the
fact that the vast number of Internet hardware and service corporations still remain in the
United States. The lobbying power of these corporations will make it difficult to
implement policy against their best wishes. Conversely, though, with the majority of
Internet corporations headquartered in the United States, this country is in a unique
position to spearhead international Internet policy. However, this suggestion would not
be taken well within the international community.
201. Jeffrey L. Gertler, China’s WTO Accession—The Final Countdown, in CHINA
AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 55, 61 (Deborah Z. Cass et al. eds., 2003).
202. Most favored nation (MFN) status accords the receiving country equal
treatment with any other country in the WTO. Id. The United States granted China MFN
status but can remove this status to punish China for its human rights violation, thus
placing China at a trade disadvantage relative to other countries that trade with the
United States. Unfortunately, the offending corporations as well as all other American
corporations profiting in China will lobby against this proposal. See Tom Zeller, Jr.,
Web Firms Questioned On Dealings In China, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2006, at C1.

246

SHYU POST-AUTHOR PAGES.DOC

4/22/2008 1:33:43 PM

Speak No Evil

[VOL. 45: 211, 2008]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

noted China’s new willingness to reduce its tariff and nontariff barriers
and to allow foreign competition within its borders.203 More importantly,
China is now bound by the rules of the WTO and must resolve its trade
disputes under international law. 204 It is possible that over time the
global marketplace and the WTO will force China to accept and follow
international law.
Moreover, the pressure of the international economic community, as
opposed to the international community as a whole (such as that
embodied in the United Nations), has already prevailed against China’s
attempt to create its own closed wireless Internet standard. In 2003,
China required all Wi-Fi devices within its borders to incorporate
WLAN Authentication and Privacy Infrastructure (WAPI)
technology. 205 WAPI forces every user of a wireless network to register
with a centralized authentication point. 206 However, under pressure
from the WTO, China ultimately suspended this attempt to create and
control the underlying standards governing Internet access. 207
IV. RECOMMENDATION
Some experts believe the issue is still unripe for meaningful
discussion, and that when the time does arrive to take action, only a

203. See generally id.; see also Shi Guangsheng, Introduction: Working Together
for a Brighter Future Based on Mutual Benefit, in CHINA’S PARTICIPATION IN THE WTO
15, 15–21 (Henry Gao & Donald Lewis eds., 2005).
204. Qingjiang Kong, Enforcement of WTO Agreements in China: Illusion or
Reality?, in CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 201, at 132. However,
if China violates the WTO agreements it is entirely possible that China will not submit to
the WTO’s dispute resolution system. This is on account of South Korea’s and Japan’s
particularly negative experiences with the same system. For an explanation of their
experience, see Henry Gao, Aggressive Legalism: The East Asian Experience and
Lessons for China, in CHINA’S PARTICIPATION IN THE WTO, supra note 203, at 315, 322–
34.
205. GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 98, at 101.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 102. The authors also aptly note that while China may attempt to control
the Internet by controlling the standards guarding access and use, other offenders attempt
to exercise control in different formats on different topics. As discussed before, ICANN
holds tightly to its jurisdiction over domain name registration from its base in the United
States. In Europe, regulators applied the continent’s broad privacy laws to the Microsoft
Internet service’s collection of user data. These laws forced Microsoft to implement
global changes to its service. Id. at 174–77; see Article 29 Data Protection Working
Party, Working Document on On-line Authentication Services 4–11 (Jan. 29, 2003),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2003/wp68_en.pdf.
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globally directed and implemented solution will suffice. 208 The future
long-term solution may consider cultural perceptions of the Internet,
redefining geographic and political borders, and possibly rewriting the
underlying structure of the Internet itself. 209
However, this Comment only addresses the short-term solution to
China’s censorship of the Internet and subsequent persecution of its
citizens. This Comment also suggests a multipronged approach
encompassing the use of proxy-blocking services, international economic
pressure, and the passage of an abbreviated version of the Global Online
Internet Act.
Savvy Chinese Internet users already use proxy-blocking services
such as Anonymizer. Although the funding for these programs may run
against current United States public policy, this nation has had a long
history of promoting anonymous speech and must continue to promote
this in China. Moreover, against a background of radical political change
and vaguely written law, interested Chinese citizens already use word of
mouth to spread information and can easily spread information about
Anonymizer and other similar services that can circumvent government
censors.
The international community may leverage China’s recent entry into
the WTO against China to encourage a retreat from Internet censorship.
While free market forces direct corporations into China and the lure of
profits compel them to comply with Chinese laws, the international
community must not forget that China’s desire to join the world
economy is reciprocal to the world’s desire to invest in China.
International economic pressure has the potential to effect substantial
change in China.
Although this solution may lessen the extent of the human rights
violations, it fails to regulate American corporations in China, especially
those that cooperate with Chinese censorship laws. Here, the Global
Online Freedom Act can play its role. If passed in an abbreviated form,
the bill can apply fines against American companies that participate in
Chinese censorship without involving the Department of State in the
enforcement of American laws abroad.

208. “[T]he United States, China, and Europe are using their coercive powers to
establish different visions of what the Internet might be. . . . The result is the beginning
of a technological version of the cold war, with each side pushing its own vision of the
Internet’s future.” GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 98, at 184.
209. See generally id.; LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE
(1999) (arguing that the very architecture of cyberspace can be changed to address
Internet-related economic and legal problems); Jonathan Zittrain, Saving the Internet,
HARV. BUS. REV., June 2007, at 49, 55 (focusing on how domestic trends towards userfriendly Internet devices may stifle creativity).
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V. CONCLUSION
Chinese censorship and the subsequent prosecution of its online
writers presents a serious problem that continues to escalate each day as
the Chinese firewall grows in complexity and sophistication. Although
the Internet was once considered uncontrollable by any one nation, with
the aid of American corporations China is succeeding in creating a
second-tier Internet—one that increasingly delivers only news approved
by the government. The complicity of these American corporations,
coupled with the complacency of their shareholders, requires the United
States and the international community to create and implement a
solution to reintroduce freedom of speech in China. 210
However, the chosen solution must consider the worldwide implications
resulting from its implementation. Even though the Global Online Freedom
Act in its current form would go against American public policy, the use
of both proxy-blocking services and international economic pressure to
create change in China would not. Instead, these recommendations
would provide an effective short-term solution to circumventing Chinese
Internet censorship.

210. One of Google’s founders, Sergey Brin, recently admitted, “On a business
level, that decision to enter China was a net negative based on our reputation in the rest
of the world suffering.” However, Google has not committed to a change in policy.
Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, Google Links Setbacks in China to Problems with Local
Net Rivals, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2007, at 8.
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